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INTRODUCTION 
The title of this Article borrows from the subtitle of one of Ronald 
Dworkin’s last books, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the 
American Constitution.1 This Article argues that the United States 
Constitution—or any constitution, for that matter—should be interpreted 
“morally,” as Dworkin posits; but, forgoing Dworkin’s company, this 
Article argues that the morality used in this interpretative venture, which 
he oddly called “interpretive,”2 ought to be natural law morality. 
To begin, natural law requires an explanation. To do so, it is useful to 
explain first what natural law is not. Given the unending confusions, both 
terminological and conceptual, this clarification is virtually necessary, and 
is tackled in Part I, which is followed by an overview in Part II of what 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by SANTIAGO LEGARRE. 
 * LL.B., Universidad Católica Argentina; M.St., Oxford; Ph.D., 
Universidad de Buenos Aires. Professor of Law, Universidad Católica Argentina; 
Independent Researcher, CONICET (Buenos Aires); Visiting Professor, Notre 
Dame Law School (Indiana) and Strathmore Law School (Nairobi). Many thanks 
to the editors of the Louisiana Law Review and to Hector Legarre (in pace), Paul 
Baier, John Baker, Michael Bradley, Patrick Button, Madeline Rose Gillen, Sam 
Gregg, Mary Joseph, Dwight King, Pat Martin, Gregory Mitchell, Larry Solum, 
Jim Stoner, Lee Strang, and Olivia Zicari Clausen for excellent feedback. This 
Article is dedicated to the memory of the late Cheney Joseph, Jr. 
 1. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (Oxford Univ. Press 1996). 
 2. Id. at 12. 
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natural law means for the purposes of this Article. Guided by the classical 
tradition,3 this Part also attempts to clarify how natural law connects to 
positive law. In light of the diverse modes of connection between natural 
and positive law, Part III argues that natural law can factor into 
constitutional interpretation in subtle but significant ways. More 
specifically, this Article suggests that natural law has two different levels 
of presence in constitutional law. The interpretation of constitutional 
norms, this Article argues, is more moral with regard to one of the two 
modes of connection and more technical with regard to the other mode. 
Finally, this Article offers some conclusions. 
Why “new” natural law? Russell Hittinger coined the expression “new 
natural law theory” in his 1987 book A Critique of the New Natural Law 
Theory.4 He used the term to describe and, indeed, as he hoped, 
delegitimize a school of thought that has in Germain Grisez its founder 
and architect,5 John Finnis a main builder, and Robert P. George its more 
recent—and most exuberant—voice.6 But these three scholars—as well as 
others who purportedly fall under the related label “new natural lawyers”—
never seemed to like the term “new natural law theory.”7 In an apparent 
compromise, Finnis accepted an alternative, not altogether different brand: 
the new classical natural law theory.8  
                                                                                                             
 3. See infra note 8. 
 4. RUSSELL HITTINGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY 
(Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1987).  
 5. According to a self-declared member of the “new natural law” crew, “new 
natural law” is “the name given a particular revival and revision of Thomistic 
Natural Law theory,” a revision “initiated in the 1960s by Germain Grisez.” 
CHRISTOPHER O. TOLLEFSEN, THE WITHERSPOON INST., The New Natural Law 
Theory 1, 4 n.1 (2012), http://www.nlnrac.org/contemporary/new-natural-law-
theory#_ednref1 (last visited Oct. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/MG2X-NS2Y]. 
 6. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL (Oxford Univ. Press 1993). 
 7. After recognizing that Finnis’s work with Germain Grisez and Joseph 
Boyle in developing the understanding of practical reasoning has come to be 
known as the “new” natural law theory, Robert P. George argues, in his opening 
contribution to Finnis’s festschrift, that the expression “new natural law theory” 
is problematic. Robert P. George, Introduction: The Achievement of John Finnis, 
in REASON, MORALITY, AND LAW: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN FINNIS 1, 6 n.15 
(John Keown & Robert P. George eds., 2013) [hereinafter REASON, MORALITY, 
AND LAW]. Finnis’s own sharp reservations regarding the label also are featured 
there. JOHN FINNIS, Reflections and Responses, in REASON, MORALITY, AND LAW, 
supra, at 468 n.31. 
 8. John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 5 (Jules Coleman & 
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). In 1991, Finnis already had alluded to “the new 
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Here, “new natural law” is used only as a catchphrase.9 As explained 
in Part I, the term “natural law” is confusing and misleading—so much so 
that Finnis, the leading contemporary natural law scholar, has written a 
lengthy book, Natural Law and Natural Rights, throughout which he 
avoids using the term “natural law” consistently and purposefully to 
prevent misunderstandings.10 Furthermore, “natural law” has an old-
fashioned ring to it that might dissuade readers. Although readers would 
be disenchanted if they assumed they would find in the author’s writing 
something substantially different from the classical natural law theory of 
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, this Article uses a phrase that alerts the 
readers to the fact that his presentation of the classical teachings, though 
by no means uniquely the author’s,11 is indeed “new.”  
I. WHAT NATURAL LAW IS NOT 
“Natural law” in this Article does not mean what it means in three 
different contexts in which the expression sometimes is used. This Article 
shall indicate in what respects the meaning that the author holds to be focal 
has something in common with and how it differentiates from the other 
meanings. In so doing, this Article will inevitably start to define natural 
law. 
First, natural law in this Article is not the singular of the plural 
expression “natural laws,” that is, the laws of nature, such as the laws of 
                                                                                                             
classical theory.” JOHN FINNIS, Contents, in 1 NATURAL LAW III (N.Y. Univ. 
Press 1991). 
 9. See Santiago Legarre, H.L.A. Hart and the Making of the New Natural 
Law Theory, 8 JURISPRUDENCE 82 (2017). 
 10. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011). 
Chapter II of the book is tellingly titled “Images and Objections.” See Maris 
Köpcke Tinturé, Positive Law’s Moral Purpose(s): Towards a New Consensus?, 
56 AM. J. JURIS. 183, 213 (2011) (review essay) (“The important and potentially 
fruitful common threads between ‘natural law theories’ and [more positivist 
approaches] only begin to emerge . . . once the distracting quarrels about labels 
are set aside.”). 
 11. After years of positivism’s cultural dominance, there is presently a revival 
of natural law theory, though many times the revival of natural law theory appears 
under other names—many of which do not even include the label “natural.” See 
Cristóbal Orrego, Natural Law Under Other Names: De Nominibus Non est 
Disputandum, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 77, 77 (2007) (maintaining that in the last half of the 
twentieth century there has been a revival of some basic tenets of the theory of 
natural law); see also Randy Barnett, A Law Professors’ Guide to Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 655, 656 n.5 (1997) (highlighting how 
natural law rhetoric is presently less mysterious than it used to be). 
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thermodynamics and, more generally, of physics—and chemistry, 
biology, and even “laws,” such as “big fish eat small fish” or “wildebeest 
migrate”—where gravity, for example, would be a “natural law.”12 These 
natural laws differ from what natural law means in this Article in that 
natural laws do not apply exclusively to human agents;13 instead, natural 
law as understood in this Article applies only to persons. Furthermore, to 
the extent that the laws of physics apply to humans, human freedom is 
irrelevant for the operation of those laws. If, for example, someone jumps 
from the ninth floor of a building, the person will fall and eventually die, 
regardless of his hypothetical will to live.14 “Natural laws” are in that sense 
inexorable—unlike, as shall be seen, the author’s natural law.15  
The fact that the term “natural law” may be, and sometimes is, used to 
refer to each one of these singular physical natural laws invites confusion, 
thus necessitating this clarification. When Doctor Strange, in the recent 
cinematic adaptation of the eponymous Marvel comic, is reprimanded by 
Mister Wong, a so-called guardian of the natural law, for violating the 
natural law of time, what Mister Wong means is hardly related to what the 
author means by a breach of natural law: the latter is a freely chosen action 
or omission, not only a physical performance or fact, and it is certainly not 
inexorable.16 One is free to abide or not to abide by what is indicated to 
one by natural law, as morally right or wrong. The latter indication is like 
a whisper, a quiet voice that, unless one has become quite deaf to it, 
suggests in one’s metaphorical ear to do that or not to do this. The listener 
                                                                                                             
 12. Zuckert observes that a scientific law of nature, such as gravity, cannot 
be disobeyed, but a moral law of nature can. Michael P. Zuckert, Do Natural 
Rights Derive from Natural Law?, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 715 (1997). 
Further, as explained by Orrego, “natural” in “natural law” “does not mean 
something related to the physical world, but rather to the rational world of human 
morality.” Cristóbal Orrego, The Relevance of the Central Natural Law Tradition 
for Cross-Cultural Comparison: Philosophical and Systematic Considerations, 8 
J. COMP. L. 26, 32 (2014). 
 13. The whole of these natural laws was called by the Theistic classics “eternal 
law”: the “hand” of God governing everything—the author’s metaphor. THOMAS 
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I–II, q. 91, 1 c (Anton C. Pegis ed., Random House 
1944) (c. 1265). But confusingly enough, and given that everything includes free 
persons, the part of that eternal law governing them was called by those classics, 
and by the author here, natural law. Id. at q. 91, 2 c. 
 14. Another example is the death of living creatures, which happens sooner or 
later. Sometimes people are heard saying, “Her grandfather died. Well, it was natural 
that he should die before her.” Again, this sense—where “natural” means statistically 
prevailing—is not what is meant in this Article by “natural” in natural law. 
 15. See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 420–21. 
 16. DOCTOR STRANGE (Marvel Studios 2016). 
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is free to ignore that “natural law whisper” or to act under its influence—
although he will face negative moral consequences if he chooses to ignore 
the whisper and, if well formed, the listener’s conscience will reprimand 
him.17 
Incidentally, the likes of Mister Wong typically add the article “the” 
to construct the expression “the natural law,” as singular of “natural laws”; 
whereas, the author—and most of those who use the expression in the 
classical sense—just say “natural law.”18 This indication can be a small, 
trifling way to tell ab initio what the speaker or writer in question likely has 
in mind when he uses the expression. Along similar lines, those scholars 
who use the term “natural law” in its classical, moral sense will never use 
the plural “natural laws,” a terminological choice that stresses that only one 
true morality exists: natural, moral law—though it has several principles and 
precepts.19 
Secondly, natural law is not Christian morality. In 2016, the author 
gave a lecture at Cornell Law School on the topic of the natural law 
foundations of comparative constitutionalism. The first question, or rather 
remark, received was, “Surely what you are talking about when you discuss 
natural law is the Catechism of the Catholic Church!”20 This observation 
was the object of several questions too in 2017 when the author presented 
on natural law and constitutional law at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center, 
Louisiana State University.21 Judge O’Scannlain, of the Ninth Circuit put it 
neatly: “There is . . . a widespread view that the natural law is parochial, 
specifically, Catholic.”22 The “widespread view,” though wrong, is quite 
understandable. Some of the contents of natural law morality overlap with 
those of Christian morality.23 Furthermore, some of the writers in the 
                                                                                                             
 17. See infra note 72.  
 18. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1999). 
 19. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at I–II, q. 94, 2 c. 
 20. The lecture took place on November 21, 2016, and it was graciously 
sponsored by the American Constitution Society. Professor Santiago Legarre, 
Professor of Law, Universidad Católica Argentina, Presentation at Cornell Law 
School (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gFEcpwZOc0&list 
=PLj8_LAnn8CZc_fAlI3kaSkohn2V8ybGys [https://perma.cc/A7Q2-82A9]. 
 21. The lecture took place on January 24, 2017, and it was graciously sponsored 
by the Eric Voegelin Institute. Professor Santiago Legarre, Professor of Law, 
Universidad Católica Argentina, Presentation at Paul M. Hebert Law Center (Jan. 
24, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRMo1sSSIJw&index=2&list=PLj 
8_LAnn8CZc_fAlI3kaSkohn2V8ybGys [https://perma.cc/ADN8-VXDF]. 
 22. Hon. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American 
Tradition, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1514 (2011). 
 23. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at I–II, q. 94, 6 c. 
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natural law tradition have held that the Ten Commandments contain a 
summary version of natural law;24 plus, there is also the circumstance that 
several of those writers, including Thomas Aquinas, the most celebrated 
one of all, are canonized by the Catholic Church and therefore are called 
“saints.”25 
That some of the contents of two different normative orders coincide, 
however, does not make them the same thing. First, the coincidence in 
question is by no means one between natural law and the morality of the 
Catholic religion only. Other religions, too, subscribe to a morality that 
overlaps with natural law, and the aforementioned statement that the Ten 
Commandments render natural law in a nutshell confirms this different 
overlap—those commandments are mainly, and certainly initially, 
Jewish.26 Furthermore, important Jewish scholars argue that natural law is 
significantly present in the Old Testament, even if under different names.27 
Secondly, any revealed religious morality, including the Jewish and 
Christian varieties in their different instantiations and confessions, has a 
requisite that is absent in natural law morality: faith. One of the key tenets 
of natural law is its appeal to reason only. There is no need of God’s 
revealing natural law morality and no need for human beings to believe in 
Him and His authority to be able to discern between what is right and what 
is wrong—that is, natural law.28 To stress this notion, when the author 
teaches jurisprudence, he tells his students that natural law is “the religion 
of the atheist”—an idea quite in line with Saint Paul’s words to the Roman 
pagans: even though they did not have the revealed religion, they “still 
through their own innate sense [that is, natural law] behave as the [Jewish] 
Law commands . . . . They can demonstrate the effect of the [natural] Law 
engraved on their hearts, to which their own conscience bears witness.”29 
Of course, the fact that pagan writers, such as Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, 
and Cicero all accepted that there is natural moral law—under different 
names and not by faith in a revelation—confirms the general sentiment of 
                                                                                                             
 24. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 101. 
 25. See JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
 26. Exodus 20:1–17 (New Jerusalem Bible). 
 27. DAVID NOVAK, NATURAL LAW IN JUDAISM 3161 (1987). The author is 
no scholar of Judaism but has written on the subject. See Santiago Legarre, 
Natural Law in Judaism Revisited, 82 PRUDENTIA IURIS 239, 240–44 (2016). 
 28. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 88. 
 29. Romans 2:14–15 (New Jerusalem Bible). 
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the argument in this Part.30 For how can a pre-Christian concept be 
Christian? 
Saint Paul’s words about the gentiles or the author’s claiming that 
natural law is the religion of the atheist by no means suggests that natural 
law is irrelevant for the believer: he also can engage in natural, moral 
reasoning—abstaining momentarily from using his faith—if he, for 
whatever reason, so wishes. Having made clear that an essential difference 
exists between natural law and the morality of any revealed religion, it is 
worth stressing, again, that, other than overlapping contents, another 
similarity exists between them and, in particular, between natural law and 
Catholic morality: both natural law morality and Catholic morality, as well 
as some other religious moralities, presuppose freedom.31 In this respect, 
natural law is closer to Catholic morality than it is to “natural laws.” For 
natural laws, as already explained, freedom is quite irrelevant. Nevertheless, 
Catholic morality still differs from natural law—not only because it requires 
faith but also because its normative order is of a much higher and more 
exacting character than that of natural law.32 Indeed, Catholic morality 
aspires to guide the faithful to heaven by promoting their identification 
with Christ through the operation of supernatural grace, for which 
purposes it imposes on Christians obligations that are foreign to and 
sometimes more exacting than natural law.33 Case in point, the obligation 
of attending Mass on Sunday and of fasting during Lent are clear instances 
of religious duties that are not in and of themselves moral, natural law 
obligations insofar as their direct source is the Church’s authority and not 
reason.34 
                                                                                                             
 30. The “central tradition of natural law,” explains Kirk, has “roots in Plato 
and Aristotle, [is] later and more fully expounded by Cicero, Seneca, and the 
Roman jurisconsults; then passing from the Stoic sages to the Fathers of the 
Church.” Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the Constitution of the United States, 69 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1993). 
 31. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 420–21. 
 32. FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 
24, at 226. 
 33. For an example, see Matthew 6:1–2 (New Jerusalem Bible). 
 34. The first precept, “You shall attend Mass on Sundays and holy days of 
obligation,” requires the faithful to participate in the Eucharistic celebration when 
the Christian community gathers together on the day commemorating the 
Resurrection of the Lord. Catechism of the Catholic Church, n.2042, THE HOLY 
SEE, http://www .vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P75.HTM (last visited Feb. 28, 
2018) [https://perma.cc/69K8-9LMP]. The fifth precept, “You shall observe the 
prescribed days of fasting and abstinence," ensures the times of ascesis and penance 
which prepare us for the liturgical feasts; they help us acquire mastery over our 
instincts and freedom of heart. Id. n.2043. 
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Thirdly, natural law should be differentiated from so-called “natural 
law jurisprudence”—a tag sometimes attached to a certain theory of 
interpretation of the United States Constitution.35 That theory has been 
traced to early decisions of the United States Supreme Court that regularly 
relied on supposed natural law concepts, sometimes at the expense of the 
Constitution.36 When the theory was revived during the Lochner era,37 
disguised as substantive due process jurisprudence,38 and revived again with 
the Warren Court and in more recent cases, too,39 it triggered similar criticisms 
of resurrecting natural law.40 In a nutshell, natural law jurisprudence posits the 
substitution of the text of the Constitution by abstract notions of justice, that 
is, “natural law.” This natural law jurisprudence has rightly been criticized.41 
But this natural law jurisprudence is not the natural law this Article 
contemplates. Indeed, as Professor Roger P. Alford has remarked, some 
versions of natural law jurisprudence as constitutional theory are compatible 
with a certain relativism that denies moral truth.42 Nothing could be further 
                                                                                                             
 35. As the Wall Street Journal put it recently, “[N]atural law, . . . in the 19th 
and early 20th century influenced Supreme Court decisions invalidating 
progressive legislation.” Jess Bravin, Gorsuch has Strong Tie to Proponent of 
Morality-Based ‘Natural Law’, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2017, 4:42 PM) (on file 
with author). 
 36. Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 639, 660–63 (2005) (citing Supreme Court decisions from the 
early years relying on “natural law” concepts at the expense of the written 
constitution); see also Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring 
Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97, 118 (2016) (“Many associate natural law with 
things like Justice Chase’s purportedly antiformal opinion in Calder v. Bull”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 37. Justice Black, dissenting in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515 
(1965), famously stated by way of criticism that what the majority was embracing 
was “the same natural law due process philosophy found in Lochner v. New York 
[198 U.S. 45 (1905)].” 
 38. It has sometimes been labeled “natural law due process philosophy” or 
“natural law due process theory.” Griswold, 381 U.S. at 524, 511 n.3 (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
 39. For examples, from Griswold onwards, see Alford, supra note 36, at 667–73. 
 40. Justice Black is worth quoting again: the reasoning of the majority in 
Griswold, he argued critically, “was the same natural law due process philosophy 
which many later opinions repudiated.” Griswold, 381 U.S. at 516. 
 41. Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, http://legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04 
.msp (last visited Mar. 14, 2017) (arguing against the revival of natural law 
jurisprudence) [https://perma.cc/EN4A-8BGD]. 
 42. Roger. P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International 
Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 19 (2005). 
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from the view supported in this Article than that natural law. Not only does 
the author’s classical conception of natural law adhere to moral 
cognitivism, but it also is perfectly compatible with, and indeed requires, 
presumptively, respect for man-made, written laws in all their positivity.43 
Unlike natural law jurisprudence, which favors the use of natural law by 
judges “to strike down all state laws which they think are unwise, 
dangerous, or irrational”44 and seems to invoke a “mysterious and 
uncertain natural law concept as a reason for striking down . . . state law,”45 
the new classical natural law theory defended in this Article denounces 
that jurisprudence as a judicial misuse of natural law and advocates, 
instead, respect for positive law as a requirement precisely of natural law 
itself.46 
Finally, by way of contrast with natural law jurisprudence, which is a 
parochial doctrine—a theory of interpretation in the United States—the 
author’s natural law is, in a way, the opposite: a universal concept that 
transcends boundaries not only of geography but also of time.  
II. NATURAL LAW FOR DUMMIES 
After centuries, Antigone’s words to her uncle Creon in Sophocles’s 
celebrated play are still the most apt way to introduce natural law. 
Although she refers to the laws of Hades—the terminology “natural law” 
came into use later—her terms apply mutatis mutandis to the reality of 
natural law: “[The] life [of these laws] is not of today or yesterday, but from 
all time, and no man knows when they were first put forth.”47 These words 
underline one of natural law’s main traits: its temporal universality.48 
Natural law, unlike human law, is indeed “not of today or yesterday, but 
from all time.”49 What is currently inherently wrong was wrong in the past 
and will be wrong in the future. Circumstances may change, but once 
                                                                                                             
 43. See discussion infra Part III. 
 44. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 517 n.10 (Black, J., dissenting). Along similar 
lines, and also noting the Lochnerian roots of this jurisprudence, see Justice 
Stewart’s dissent in the same case. Id. at 528 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 46. This topic is revisited infra Part III when dealing with the strengths and 
limits of the positions of Robert P. George and Samuel Gregg. 
 47. SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE pt. 6, l. 500 (E. H. Plumptre trans., Harvard 
Classics c. 1909-1914) (c. 441 B.C.).  
 48. For an explanation of natural law’s universality, see FINNIS, Contents, 
supra note 8, § IV.1–2. 
 49. SOPHOCLES, supra note 47. 
886  LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
circumstances are clearly defined and circumscribed, the morality or 
immorality of an act will remain the same.  
There is a further universality implicit in Antigone’s dialogue with 
Creon: by way of contrast with human, domestic laws—the laws of 
Thebes, Creon’s edict—natural law is the same everywhere.50 The pagan 
philosopher Cicero formulated this idea early when, explaining “true law,” 
what he also called “right reason in agreement with nature” and the author 
calls “natural law,” he wrote that this law “will not be different in Rome 
and in Athens . . . but is one, eternal and unchangeable law for all nations.”51 
In other words, murder, for instance, is wrong in Rome, Athens, Thebes, and 
everywhere else in the world. Although customs, conventions, and positive 
enactments—human laws—may vary, natural law remains constant regardless 
of location.52 
The contemporary expression “objective critical morality”53 captures 
this twofold universality well. By holding that natural law is “objective,” 
the term excludes from its meaning the type of relativism that affirms that 
there are only subjective moral utterances or preferences—judgments 
without any real, true moral value: “What is true is true only because 
someone holds it to be so” is the relativist’s motto. In rejecting this 
relativism, the classical conception of natural law thus adheres to moral 
cognitivism—a certain, if limited, optimism concerning the ability of 
human reason to understand what is right and what is wrong, at least in its 
basic core.54 It might be useful to borrow from one of natural law theory’s 
recent proponents, according to whom natural law is about the acceptance 
of “the objective value of human reason and the objectivity of what is good 
or evil regarding at least certain things that are basic human goods for all 
persons, regardless of time or culture.”55 By holding that natural law is 
critical, the above definition stresses that this discussion does not concern 
                                                                                                             
 50. FINNIS, Contents, supra note 8, § IV.1–2. 
 51. CICERO, DE REPUBLICA III.33 (Niall Rudd trans., Oxford Univ. Press 
2009) (c. 54–51 B.C.). The translation from Latin is the author’s. 
 52. FINNIS, Contents, supra note 8, § IV.1–2. 
 53. “[T]he distinction between merely conventional morality and critical 
morality also captures the basic idea that some things may be morally good, and just, 
regardless of social conventions to the contrary.” Orrego, The Relevance of the Central 
Natural Law Tradition for Cross-Cultural Comparison, supra note 11, at 32. 
 54. In MacIntyre’s words, for the classical tradition there is “a crucial 
distinction between what any particular individual at any particular time takes to 
be good for him and what is really good for him as a man.” ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 150 (Notre Dame Press 2007). 
 55. Id. at 34. 
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a merely conventional morality; it regulates and passes judgment on 
changing mores rather than reflecting them uncritically. 
What the “basic core” just alluded to is and which those “basic human 
goods” are56—in other words, what is the precise extent of natural law 
theory’s optimism about the human capacity of understanding what is truly 
right and wrong and where, instead, the boundaries of true natural law 
appear blurred as a result of a limited perception of truth in moral 
matters57—these are problems that exceed this Article’s purposes. Note 
that the hurdles inherent in coming to right conclusions in difficult moral 
questions do not in themselves pose an insurmountable burden for natural 
law theory. For starters, the theory has a meta-ethical dimension to which 
the substance of moral claims is quite irrelevant.58 One person may 
disagree with another about the rights or wrongs of abortion, for example, 
but the two persons will be engaging in some form of natural law theory—
at a meta-ethical level, that is—if they both accept that there is a right 
answer to the question of abortion, even if they disagree as to which that 
                                                                                                             
 56. Thomas Aquinas identified several “natural inclinations” crucial to the 
understanding of morality and then and there called the various naturally 
discernible objects of those various inclinations “human goods.” These goods, he 
said, are identified and directed to by first principles of practical reason and 
natural law. Hence, they can be called “basic” goods, by transference from “first” 
principles. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at I–II, q. 94, 2 c. Following his lead, John 
Finnis famously listed seven basic goods and ten requirements of practical 
reasonableness. Id. at III–V. Justice Gorsuch, one of Finnis’s former students, 
further noted that “there are certain irreducible and categorical moral goods and 
evils. The existence of such moral absolutes has been suggested by Aristotle, 
argued by Aquinas, and defended by contemporary natural law thinkers.” Neil M. 
Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 599, 697–98 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 57. Aquinas held that the most general principles of natural law are known to 
all: self-evident—per se nota—universally. Still, in the course of deriving more 
specific moral precepts from these first moral principles, even “where there is the 
same rectitude in matters of detail, [what is right] is not equally known to all.” 
AQUINAS, supra note 13, at I–II, q. 94, 4 c. This happens either as a result of 
simple error in the reasoning process from general principles to specific precepts 
or because of one’s own vices. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at I–II, q. 94, 4 c, 6 c. 
Furthermore, as noted by a contemporary, secular constitutional scholar in a 
similar vein, “To say that [something] is self-evident does not imply that it is 
necessarily uncontroversial. People may, for various reasons, not understand an 
idea that is self-evident, or may dispute what they know to be true.” Christopher 
L.M. Eisgruber, Justice Story, Slavery, and the Natural Law Foundations of 
American Constitutionalism, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 273, 319 n.114 (1988). 
 58. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, § III–IV. 
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answer is.59 Their agreement places them on the same side of the divide, 
on the other side of which stands the relativist, who denies the very 
possibility of affirming anything but preferences in moral matters:60 “It is 
not that you are right and I wrong; you just happen to feel that that is the 
best path and I do not. That is it: there is nothing to argue about because 
there are no reasons at stake; only emotions.”  
Furthermore, and as to natural law considered as an ethical theory—
that is, a substantive philosophy of the good and the right—it is important 
to draw a distinction. One can concede that there are many difficult moral 
questions regarding which rational understanding, devoid of religious 
tools—as natural law reasoning, by definition, is—certainly proves 
difficult;61 therefore, one can concede, too, that in those types of questions, 
rational argument and persuasion are oftentimes doomed to failure in 
practice—in the practice of conversations between friends and, even more 
so, among the members of a legislature or court.62 But this concession—
which the author happily makes—is fully compatible with the claim that 
there are many other moral questions, the right answers to which are 
readily accessible to everyone, as simple moral experience attests. 
On a different but related note, Antigone also contrasts Creon’s 
written statute with an “unwritten” law.63 Natural law is not written, which 
means it is not “positive” law; rather, to borrow from Aquinas’s metaphor, 
it is “written on our hearts.”64 
                                                                                                             
 59. In this sense and in this sense only, Ronald Dworkin’s is a “natural law 
theory.” Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. 
& PUBLIC AFF. 87, 88–89 (1996) (speaking of “objective truth” in the context of 
morality). And, for a work earlier in time, but less on point—despite its title—see 
generally Ronald Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982). 
 60. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 19 (Notre Dame Press 2007). 
 61. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at I–II, q. 94, 4 c (holding that although the most 
general principles of natural law are known to all, the understanding of the more 
specific moral precepts derived from those first moral principles is not equally 
known to all). 
 62. A good example is offered by the contrasting positions held by Justice 
Scalia and Justice White on nude dancing in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 
U.S. 560 (1991). 
 63. SOPHOCLES, supra note 47, at l. 500. 
 64. THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE LETTER OF ST. PAUL TO THE 
ROMANS, cap. 2 l. 3 nn.218–19 [hereinafter AQUINAS, SUPER ROM.]. Aquinas, of 
course, in employing this metaphor is not suggesting that the human person’s vital 
organ is inscribed with inky markings. In his commentary on St. Paul’s letter to 
the Romans—see supra Part I, at note 28—Aquinas makes clear what he 
understands Paul to mean: 
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Another characteristic of natural law, partly derived from its unwritten 
character, is that natural law is an incomplete normative order.65 At least 
this characteristic holds true for classical and the so-called “new” or “new 
classical” understandings of natural law,66 as opposed to seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century rationalistic accounts that see natural law as a refined, 
fully articulated moral code not needing any positive complement.67 These 
accounts are out of fashion now and rightly considered decadent.68 But 
they are still worth mentioning and distinguishing from the concept 
defended in this Article to avoid confusions and misleading implications, 
especially given that “natural law jurisprudence” alluded to in the previous 
Part of this Article has much in common with rationalistic natural law 
theories insofar as Lochner-era natural law jurisprudence, too, makes 
positive, constitutional law virtually superfluous and redundant.69 The 
author’s natural law, on the other hand, is perfectly compatible with and 
actually requires respect for the positivity of man-made, written laws.70 
Indeed, positive laws must be in place because natural law’s promulgation 
of what is right and what is wrong is insufficient:71 no one should argue 
that he “did not hear the whisper!”72 
                                                                                                             
[It] can be likened to a law presented to man from without and which it 
is customary to deliver in writing on account of the memory’s weakness; 
whereas, those who observe the law without externally hearing the law show 
that what the law requires is written ‘not with ink, but’ first and chiefly ‘with 
the Spirit of the living God’ (2 Cor. 3:3), and secondly through study: ‘Write 
them on the tablet of your heart’ (Pr. 3:3). 
AQUINAS, SUPER ROM., supra, cap. 2 l. 3 n.218. 
 65. J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 260 
(Clarendon Press 1992) (contrasting classical natural law theory with rationalistic 
accounts according to which natural law is a complete normative order). 
 66. Aquinas argues that “many things for the benefit of human life have been 
added over and above the natural law, . . . by human laws.” AQUINAS, supra note 
13, at I-II, q. 94, a. 5c. 
 67. KELLY, supra note 65, at 260 (“Particularly in Germany, natural law was 
taken—of course in the secular sense which Grotius had given it—to be a material 
from which whole systems of municipal law could be fashioned . . . .”) 
(commenting on the work of Pufendorf, Wolff, Vattel, and others). 
 68. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 43–48 
(criticizing some of the rationalistic accounts of natural law). 
 69. See discussion supra Part I. 
 70. See discussion infra Part III. 
 71. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at I–II, q. 95, 1 c (arguing that natural law requires 
positive laws). 
 72. As explained supra Part I, natural law is like a quiet voice that suggests 
in one’s metaphorical ear to do that or not to do this. Positive law provides for 
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Whereas rationalistic accounts of natural law defend the existence of 
two separate legal orders—one natural, one positive—the new classical 
natural law theory holds instead that in normal cases, natural law exists in 
the positive law of a state, in a way similar to that in which a fluid—natural 
law—is contained in a vessel—positive law.73 But in these normal 
instances, which correspond to just positive enactments,74 natural law also 
continues to exist as a normative order independent of the legal order, both 
in the practical reasoning of the citizens of that state and the intelligence 
of the creator of that natural law.75 In pathological instances like unjust 
laws, when the positive law of a state violates a relevant natural law 
precept, natural law will not exist in that positive law—this result is what 
is meant by the otherwise confusing tag “unjust laws are not laws”76—but, 
again, natural law will subsist independently of the unjust positive law and 
provide the citizens with a moral reason to react critically, in one way or 
another, against the unjust law.77 Furthermore, the pathology also shows 
the practical effects of the coexistence of that unjust legal order with the 
natural law insofar as that unjust order may still generate legal obligations 
that do not derive from the moral content of the positive law.78 
The reference in the previous paragraph to “just positive enactments” 
and its contrast with “unjust laws” indicates truly just positive enactments 
and truly unjust laws. Of course, anyone who thinks a law is just makes 
that assessment because he really thinks that law is just and anyone who 
thinks a law is unjust makes that assessment because he really thinks that 
law is unjust. Though, indeed, it will sometimes be true that someone will 
honestly hold to be just what is unjust and unjust what is just. But, again, 
this scenario shows only the possibility of human mistake; it does not 
                                                                                                             
those situations in which, for one reason or another, a person has become deaf to 
that metaphorical whisper. 
 73. According to John Finnis, the notion that “[human, positive] law includes 
natural law” was found by Aquinas in the works of Aristotle and Cicero. FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 294. 
 74. For Professor Corwin, one example of such just enactment is the United 
States Constitution, of which he said that it “is, still, in important measure, 
[n]atural [l]aw under the skin.” Edward S. Corwin, The Debt of American 
Constitutional Law to Natural Law Concepts, 23 NOTRE DAME L. REV 258, 258 
(1950). Insofar as this is correct, it will be relevant for the considerations 
developed infra Part III, as it should become apparent. 
 75. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at I–II, 90, 1 ad 1.  
 76. For Finnis’s fundamental clarification of “lex iniusta non est lex,” see 
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at ch. XII.4. 
 77. AQUINAS, supra note 13, at I–II, q. 96, 4 c (elaborating on the different ways 
in which a law can be unjust and on how they affect the obligation to obey them). 
 78. Id. 
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preclude the ability sometimes to judge correctly when it comes to justice 
and, more generally, to morality. 
Finally, natural law is also incomplete in a different way: it does not 
provide effective sanctions for its breach.79 Note that the author is not 
arguing that natural law provides no sanction at all. On the contrary, as 
argued by Sophocles,80 Cicero,81 and countless others in the classical 
tradition,82 conscience—the reproach experienced internally—can prove a 
significant sanction for the trespasser of natural law obligations.83 But this 
sanction is not one of a coercive nature; in a society of normal people, not 
angels, coercion is morally required by natural law for the common good 
of that society. Joseph Raz argues rightly that “for human beings as they 
are the support of sanctions, to be enforced by force if necessary, is 
required to assure a reasonable degree of conformity to law and prevent 
its complete breakdown.”84 Some people undoubtedly will not experience 
the reproach of conscience: as a result of having trespassed natural law so 
often, they will have something similar to a thick skin—a deafness, 
morally speaking.85 Others who do experience it will still go ahead and 
                                                                                                             
 79. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 260–65 
(arguing for the moral need of positive sanctions).  
 80. Antigone clearly refers to this reproach of conscience when she explains 
dramatically to her uncle, Creon, that she would rather disobey his law than the 
laws of Hades, that is, natural law:  
When any one lives, as I do, compassed about with evils, can such a one 
find aught but gain in death? So for me to meet this doom is trifling grief; 
but if I had suffered my mother's son to lie in death an unburied corpse 
[which would have been the result of abiding by Creon’s edict], that 
would have grieved me. 
SOPHOCLES, supra note 47, at l. 500. 
 81. Cicero famously wrote about obedience to natural law, stating, “Whoever 
is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by 
reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what 
is commonly considered punishment.” CICERO, supra note 51, at III.33. 
 82. A paramount example can be found in FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND 
NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 260–65. 
 83. CICERO, supra note 51, at III.33. 
 84. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 159 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1990) (1975) (emphasis added). Raz, rightly again, concedes that “yet we can 
imagine other rational beings who may be subject to law, who have, and who 
would acknowledge that they have, more than enough reasons to obey the law 
regardless of sanctions.” Id. at 159. Enter Raz’s hypothesis of a “society of 
angels”: Angels, by definition, would not need sanctions, but they still “may have 
a need for legislative authorities to ensure co-ordination,” that is, positive law. Id. 
 85. The idea of thick skin recalls the whisper metaphor. See supra note 72. 
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indulge in the wrongful conduct out of pleasure, convenience, or 
weakness; when that wrongful conduct also has been made a legal crime 
by a given community, there needs to be a way to stop the criminal—a 
way that is more efficient and inescapable, up to a point, than one’s own 
conscience.86 Hence, there is a moral need for some sort of coercive 
sanctions; a need that is perfectly compatible with the understanding that 
coordination, not sanctions, is at the core of the meaning of what it is to 
have a legal system, as Professor H. L. A. Hart successfully argued against 
several forms of legal positivism.87 
III. THE CONSTITUTION IN THE LIGHT OF NATURAL LAW 
Many scholars within the natural law tradition, including some who 
hold that “reflection on the natural law tradition” is “critical to a proper 
analysis of the most difficult issues of our day,”88 consider, however, that 
natural law has no traction in the interpretation of constitutional law.89 For 
example, Judge O’Scannlain concludes, “I therefore do not believe that 
judges have an inherent right to interpret the natural law in a way that is 
binding on the rest of the country.”90 Although, like Judge O’Scannlain, 
“[the author] do[es] not believe that judges have the freestanding authority 
to enforce the natural law,”91 nevertheless, natural law has a distinctive 
role in constitutional interpretation—a role from which follows not only 
the right but also the duty to adhere to natural law in interpreting the 
Constitution in a way that, inevitably, is “binding on the rest of the 
                                                                                                             
 86. In a way, conscience is the most inescapable of all sanctions, but the 
common good requires some form of external punishment. 
 87. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 199–200 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012) 
(1961) (discussing the minimum content of natural law). Other than these pages 
that actually deal with the minimum content of positive law, the whole book 
makes a cogent argument in favor of the position mentioned in the text—a 
position followed by Raz, as his hypothesis of the society of angels shows. See 
supra note 84. 
 88. O’Scannlain, supra note 22, at 1513. 
 89. A notable exception seems to be Professor Michael Moore, whose approach 
appears to grant great traction to natural law, but his “realist” theory, though called “a 
natural law theory of interpretation,” has little in common with this author’s natural 
law theory. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087, 2088 (2001) (arguing that 
a “‘natural law’ or ‘realist’ theory of constitutional interpretation” makes possible “a 
comfortable accommodation of judicial activism and full fidelity”).  
 90. O’Scannlain, supra note 22, at 1522. 
 91. Id. 
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country.”92 To try to define the contours of that role, some general 
clarifications and reminders are in order. 
Natural law under the classical and the “new classical” tradition is 
present in positive laws93—a claim not altogether different, if rightly 
understood, from an unobjectionable Supreme Court dictum included in 
an otherwise objectionable decision:94 “The law [] is constantly based on 
notions of morality.”95 The tradition also claims that natural law is present 
in positive laws in two different ways with two different intensities: one 
greater, one lesser.96 Enter Thomas Aquinas’s theory of “derivation of 
positive from natural law” and its revisit by the “new natural law theory.”97 
In effect, Aquinas’s account of the relationship of natural law to 
positive law consists of a general theory—every just human law is derived 
from and traceable to the law of nature98—and two subordinate theorems.99 
Derivation is always either per modum conclusionum or per modum 
                                                                                                             
 92. Id. 
 93. As this Article moves to a more legal portion, where the relevance of 
natural law in constitutional adjudication appears, it is worth recollecting that, 
notwithstanding that relevance, “natural law is not primarily an instrument 
intended for use in common courts of law; rather, it is a body of precepts helping 
you and me to govern ourselves.” Kirk, supra note 30, at 1041.  
 94. Santiago Legarre & Gregory J. Mitchell, Secondary Effects and Public 
Morality, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 320, 355–57, 357 n.206 (criticizing Bowers v. 
Hardwick’s misconceived characterization of public morality and arguing that natural 
law theory is the crux of the concept of public morality in constitutional law). 
 95. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). Bowers would be 
overturned in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), an unobjectionable 
decision full of objectionable reasoning and rhetoric, but the proposition that 
“[t]he law [] is constantly based on notions of morality” as such states a general 
idea and is independent from the context in which it was proclaimed in Bowers. 
 96. See generally Santiago Legarre, Derivation of Positive from Natural Law 
Revisited, 57 AM J. JURIS. 103, 103–10 (2012) (discussing the different connections 
between natural and positive law). 
 97. In the words of a prominent “new natural lawyer,” “just and good positive 
law, including constitutional law, is always in some sense derived from the natural 
law.” GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW, supra note 18, at 236. 
 98. In the sixteenth century, the English lawyer Christopher St. Germain 
announced the following, similar dictum, which was later popularized by Finnis: 
“In every law positive well made is somewhat of the law of reason.” FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 281. 
 99. The idea of a general theory and a subordinate theorem is borrowed from 
Finnis. Id. at 285.  
894  LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
determinationis.100 According to the first theorem, positive law “may be 
derived from the natural law . . . as a conclusion from premises.”101 For 
example, “that ‘one must not kill’ may be derived as a conclusion from the 
principle that ‘one should do harm to no man.’”102 According to the second 
theorem, positive law may be derived from natural law “by way of 
determination [determinatio] of certain generalities.”103 For example, “the 
law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but that he be 
punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature.”104 As 
Finnis suggests, “There seems to be no happy English equivalent of 
‘determinatio’”—the word used by Aquinas.105 Kelsen’s “concretization,” 
he adds, “would do; implementation is more elegant.”106 
Those parts of any legal system derived from natural law by way of 
conclusion “consist of rules and principles closely corresponding to 
requirements of practical reason.”107 Therefore, as Finnis argues, 
“Discussion in courts and amongst lawyers and legislators will commonly, 
and reasonably, follow much the same course as a straightforward moral 
debate.”108 This similarity is precisely the case with regard to substantial 
chunks of constitutional law, especially when it comes to the Bill of 
                                                                                                             
 100. Both the theory and the two sub-theorems are compressed in AQUINAS, 
supra note 13, at I–II, q. 95, 2c, titled “Whether every human law is derived from 
the natural law?”; see also id. at I–II, q. 95, 4 c. 
 101. Id. at I–II, 95, 2 c. 
 102. Id. Lee Strang, a thinker in the natural law tradition, offers an interesting 
elaboration on intermediate moral principles and other related topics. Lee Strang, 
An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of Originalist 
Precedent, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1729, 1771 (2010) (attempting to reconcile 
originalism with natural law theory).  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. In the twenty-first century, Samuel Gregg gives a simple example that 
has always been quite popular among natural law theorists:  
Legislators will understand . . . that . . . responsibility to protect human 
life requires them to implement a traffic system that protects motorists’ 
lives. But a uniquely correct traffic system cannot be derived from the 
natural law. A number of arrangements, each of which has 
incommensurable advantages and weaknesses, may be consistent with 
the natural law. Hence, governments and courts must move here, not by 
deduction. 
SAMUEL GREGG, MORALITY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 34 (2001) (second 
emphasis added). 
 105. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 284. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 282. 
 108. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Rights: many such constitutional enactments consist of rules and principles 
closely corresponding to natural law requirements. This is a general claim, 
applicable to any constitution declaring or recognizing human rights. Thus, 
it is also a specific claim about the United States Constitution insofar as, in 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation, it does declare and recognize rights—
which is not to say that every single right declared in the United States 
Constitution, or in any other constitution, is derived from natural law by way 
of conclusion.  
That the aforementioned rights have been called “natural rights” by 
the American tradition is telling from the point of view of the new natural 
law theory, as it highlights that these rights preexist, morally speaking, 
positive and even constitutional law.109 But the “natural rights” tradition is 
partly and relevantly different from the classical and the new natural law 
tradition,110 and, in some of its versions, it can be partially inconsistent 
with the latter. For this reason, the former will not be elaborated further, 
but one significant difference between the two traditions is worth noting. 
Although natural law in the American tradition was “based on assumptions 
about humans and human freedom in the state of nature”111 and a natural 
right was simply a portion of a more general liberty enjoyed in the so-
called “state of nature,”112 the classical and the new natural law tradition, 
as it is well known, excludes and is incompatible with the notion of “state 
of nature.”113 
Consider the following example of a constitutional norm derived by 
way of conclusion from natural law. The interpretative process seeking to 
define the contours of the right to life, as recognized by countless 
constitutions and international conventions, involves a type of reasoning 
that is fundamentally moral. As Finnis expands in his more recent work, 
by way of further specification of the right to life example, “Our law 
against euthanasia and assisting suicide appropriately has virtually the 
same content as the natural moral law against such choices and actions, 
                                                                                                             
 109. See O’Scannlain, supra note 22, at 1514 (pointing out the significance of 
the preexistence of constitutional rights). 
 110. Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 172 
n.8 (1993) (arguing that there is “a subtle distinction between ‘natural rights’ and 
‘natural law’”). 
 111. Philip Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American 
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 923 (1993). 
 112. Id. at 908, 918, 937. Later, Hamburger insists that “natural law consisted 
of reasoning about humans in the state of nature.” Id. at 926. 
 113. Kirk, supra note 30, at 1040 (explaining that the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment’s doctrine of natural rights is “not at all identical” with the 
classical tradition of natural law). 
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and debates about its positing (about enacting or retaining it) substantially 
track moral debate about the morality of those kinds of choice and act.”114 
More generally, it is true that in issues concerning fundamental rights, the 
moral reasoning on both sides will be similar in every jurisdiction.115 In 
such cases, legal reasoning and moral reasoning overlap to a significant 
extent, rendering less relevant—which is not to say “irrelevant,” as shall 
be seen—the technicalities of each given legal system.116 
Constitutions also include many instances of derivation by way of 
determination: they include much implementation and concretization 
without which human rights would be inoperative. This determinatio 
includes, of course, constitutional arrangements, such as the separation of 
powers or federalism.117 These more technical parts and aspects of 
constitutional law, to borrow from Justice Breyer, are more “arcane”118 
matters. Additionally, it makes sense that natural law is less relevant when 
it comes to the interpretation of those parts and, conversely, more relevant 
when it comes to the interpretation of those chunks of constitutional law 
with more moral flesh,119 so to speak: those parts of constitutional law 
related to morality “by way of conclusion.”120  
                                                                                                             
 114. John Finnis, Coexisting Normative Orders? Yes, but No, 57 AM. J. JURIS. 
111, 113 (2012). 
 115. See Santiago Legarre, Towards a New Justificatory Theory of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 STRATHMORE L.J. 90, 106 (2015) (arguing 
that comparative constitutional analysis is especially meaningful in the 
determination of the scope of fundamental rights). 
 116. This is why, incidentally, comparative constitutional law is justified; it is 
also why it makes even more sense when it comes to fundamental rights. See id. 
at 107–12 (discussing the scope and limits of these claims and distinguishing 
legislative from judicial comparative constitutional analysis). 
 117. See infra note 123. 
 118. “Arcane” is Justice Breyer’s word in his well-known debate with Justice 
Scalia on the use of foreign materials in constitutional adjudication. See Norman 
Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: a 
Conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT. 
J. CONST. L. 519, 519–20 (2005), which includes a lightly edited transcription of 
the discussion, approved by the two justices. 
 119. In the alluded debate, Justice Breyer made an analogous point: borrowing 
foreign materials makes more sense when it comes to fundamental rights than it does 
regarding “arcane” matters, such as, he argued, some aspects of the law of contracts. 
Id. The author pursues this avenue further, and introduces some tweaks, in Legarre, 
Derivation of Positive from Natural Law Revisited, supra note 96, at 106–07. 
 120. Note that, though it may seem otherwise, the author’s suggestion is 
different from Judge O’Scannlain’s. In effect, though Judge O’Scannlain argues 
that “the natural law is useful when interpreting provisions of the Constitution that 
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Indeed, the main contribution of this Article may be to introduce this 
distinction.121 Natural law is more relevant when the interpretation of those 
constitutional norms that derive from natural law by way of conclusion is 
at stake—that is, the interpretation of fundamental rights, for the most 
part—and has less traction when it comes to interpreting constitutional 
provisions derived from natural law by way of determination—that is, the 
interpretation of fundamental structure. 
But one should not press this point too far. Although structural 
arrangements are technical, they are ultimately devised precisely in the 
service of the fundamental rights of those living in the relevant community. 
In the final analysis, political and legal institutions—structures—exist 
precisely to protect and foster fundamental human rights.122 So if Samuel 
Gregg is right in affirming that “constitutional design occurs by way of what 
Aquinas called in his Summa Theologiae ‘determination [determinatio] of 
certain generalities,’”123 it does not follow that natural law has no traction 
                                                                                                             
were themselves efforts to codify preexisting natural law rights,” he hastens to 
clarify that “[t]here, the judicial inquiry is an historical one, not a philosophical 
one.” O’Scannlain, supra note 22, at 1523 (emphasis added). 
 121. That natural law should be relevant when it comes to constitutional 
interpretation in general has already been argued but, as far as one can tell, with a 
different focus and with different consequences. HADLEY ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ILLUSIONS AND ANCHORING TRUTHS: THE TOUCHSTONE OF THE NATURAL LAW 
(2010); see also HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1990).  
 122. The Declaration of Independence’s language is telling: “to secure these 
[natural, preexisting] rights, Governments are instituted among Men.” THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). This has been rightly noted 
in a law review article: “The genius of the American Constitution lies in its use of 
structural devices to preserve individual liberty.” Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. 
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1992). In recent times, the United States Supreme 
Court also has noted this connection between structure and rights with regard to 
one particular structural device: federalism. “Federalism secures the freedom of 
the individual.” Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011). In a similar 
vein, Judge Gorsuch, when on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, dissented from 
a denial of rehearing en banc, stating that “the framers of the Constitution thought 
the compartmentalization of legislative power not just a tool of good government 
or necessary to protect the authority of Congress from encroachment by the 
Executive but essential to the preservation of the people’s liberty.” United States 
v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 2015).  
 123. Gregg continues rightly, “The constitutions of the United States, France, 
and Australia all involve, for instance, the separation of powers. But they do not 
realize this goal in exactly the same way. Each, however, is a reasonable way of 
realizing the same end.” Samuel Gregg, Neil Gorsuch, Natural Law, and the Limits 
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whatsoever for purposes of interpreting those parts of the Constitution. 
Constitutional arrangements exist to serve the common good—and the 
human rights—the fundamental intelligibility of which natural law theory 
affirms and explains.124  
If it is true that one should not overstress the idea that natural law is 
less relevant when interpreting constitutional structure, it is also true that 
one should not exaggerate the degree to which natural law has more traction 
when interpreting fundamental rights. This is so because, as Finnis points 
out, implications and definitions of these rights “will carry legislators and 
judges beyond the point where they could regard themselves as simply 
applying the intrinsic rule of reason, or even as deducing conclusions from 
it.”125 
So James Fleming is right in arguing that if “the Constitution embodies 
principles of natural law,”126 it follows that judges who have authority to 
interpret the Constitution also have authority, to that extent, to interpret the 
requirements of natural law.127 It is still necessary to keep in mind, however, 
that those constitutional norms derived by way of conclusion—and a fortiori 
those derived by way of determination—from “principles of natural law” 
are filtered, so to speak, by the language and the technique of the positive, 
constitutional law. This circumstance certainly ought to condition and 
modulate judicial interpretation of those norms.128 
By affirming the salience of natural law for constitutional interpretation—
that is, by defending a moral reading of the Constitution: one in the light of 
objective critical morality—the author does not intend to deny that all 
public officials in a reasonably just regime have “a duty in justice to 
                                                                                                             
of Judicial Power, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.thepublic 
discourse.com/2017/03/18766/ [https://perma.cc/VAR6-KHVC]. 
 124. See infra note 125. 
 125. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 284 
(emphasis added). This passage continues by rightly stressing that “the legal 
project of applying a permanent requirement of practical reason will itself carry 
the legislator into the second of the two categories of human or positive law.” Id. 
 126. James Fleming, Fidelity to Natural Law and Natural Rights in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2294 (2001). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Finnis sheds light once more:  
[E]ven those parts of it [positive law] which reproduce the requirements 
of morality are conceived of, and can be studied, as parts of a genuine 
whole which in its entirety and in each of its parts, most of which neither 
reproduce nor are deducible from morality’s requirements, can be 
studied as the product of human deliberation and choice. 
John Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW 195 
(Robert P. George ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996). 
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respect the constitutional limits of their own authority”;129 nor does the 
author intend to reject the view that “respecting a community’s just 
determinatio of constitutional order[] is itself a requirement of natural 
law.”130 These statements are correct statements of natural law theory by 
two of John Finnis’s former students, Robert P. George and Samuel Gregg, 
respectively; but again, it does not follow that natural law should be 
ignored or cast aside when interpreting the Constitution. George, Gregg, 
and other “new natural law theorists” who seem to be wary of natural law 
in the area of constitutional interpretation adamantly stress that the 
American constitutional system restricts the ability of judges to apply 
moral concepts.131 Although such an observation is reasonable, stressing 
that fact should not lead to overlooking a related one. the Constitution—
and any law for that matter but especially the Constitution—uses morally 
laden concepts that inexorably demand a moral interpretation by anyone, 
including judges, even if one concedes, as one should in a separation of 
powers system like the American systems, that judges have more 
interpretative restrictions than legislators.132  
Whatever a given constitutional regime restrictively determines 
regarding the ability of judges “to apply natural law”—under whatever 
name—it will still be true that judges in constitutional regimes will have a 
moral duty to interpret some words and concepts that are morally charged, 
such as “equal,” “cruel,” “freedom,” “right,” and so on. Though these 
concepts are included in a human enactment—they are, in that sense, 
positive law—their content or part thereof remains “natural,” that is, 
moral; therefore, one cannot do without natural law by means of merely 
arguing, “Ah, but the Constitution is a positive law!” Also, it is “a notable 
failure of judicial reasoning, of intellectual and moral responsibility in face 
of the law’s most fundamental point and meaning[—]the service of 
                                                                                                             
 129. Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the Theory and 
Practice of Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269, 2283 (2001). 
 130. Gregg, supra note 123. 
 131. The concern of the likes of George and Gregg has much in common with 
Justice Black’s ideas, discussed supra notes 36–40. In fact, George has noted that, 
in the context of constitutional interpretation, “[Justice] Black [in Griswold], 
Bork, Scalia, and other ‘textualists’ and ‘originalists’ are nearer the mark.”). 
George, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of Judicial 
Review, supra note 129, at 2282. 
 132. See Paul Yowell, Empirical Research in Rights-Based Judicial Review of 
Legislation, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM GERMANY AND THE UK (P.M. Huber & K. Ziegler eds., Hart 
Pub., Oxford, 2000). 
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persons”133—to treat matters of constitutional interpretation as merely 
historical questions of meaning.  
The softening of the claim that natural law ought to be accorded a 
varying importance depending on the type of constitutional norm whose 
interpretation is at stake is in the end the result of a more fundamental 
weakening. No clear-cut difference exists between the two types of 
derivation; even less so is it true that some constitutional norms are 100% 
derived from natural law by way of conclusion and the connection of other 
norms to natural law is 100% one of determinatio. This softening is 
beautifully and metaphorically expressed by Finnis, whom the author shall 
paraphrase, supplement, and quote, while applying his words, which refer 
to law in general, to the Constitution: the derivation of constitutional law 
from objective critical morality “has indeed the two principal modes 
identified and named by Aquinas; but these are not two streams flowing in 
separate channels.”134 Although the central principle underlying each 
constitutional right may be a straightforward application of universally valid, 
natural law moral requirements, the effort to integrate them into the 
constitutional order certainly will require much implementing and concretizing. 
Likewise, the determinationes implied in the several constitutional 
arrangements and structures are not fully arbitrary; if reasonable, they 
instantiate, in one way or another, a discernible common good. 
Unlike George135 and Gregg,136 who seem suspicious of natural law 
when it comes to constitutional interpretation,137 Finnis argues—rightly in 
the author’s view—that the act of interpreting the Constitution is always 
“an act which can and should be guided by ‘moral’ principles and rules; 
[and] that those moral norms are a matter of objective reasonableness, not 
of whim, convention, or mere ‘decision.’”138 Justice Scalia’s famous 
                                                                                                             
 133. John Finnis, The Priority of Persons, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 1, 
8 (Jeremy Horder ed., Series 4, 2000). Finnis exemplifies this failure with the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on the meaning of “persons” under the due process clause, from 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 134. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 289. 
 135. Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 19192 
(2008) (stressing the limits of natural law’s relevance in constitutional adjudication).  
 136. Gregg’s reluctance to award natural law relevance in constitutional 
interpretation perhaps springs from the risks inherent in “natural law jurisprudence,” 
which he rightly denounces. GREGG, supra note 104, at 34. 
 137. Judge O’Scannlain has aptly summarized the usual reasons of this 
suspicion: “Those who believe in judicial restraint are skeptical of natural law 
because, to them, it conjures up the judicial adventurism of the Lochner era and 
the Warren Court.” O’Scannlain, supra note 22, at 1515. 
 138. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 290. 
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version of “originalism” is therefore an insufficient interpretative 
technique.139 The late justice treated matters of constitutional meaning as 
mere historical investigations, without seeming to realize that, like any 
other law—or, again, even more than any other law—the Constitution 
exists to serve a people here and now and not only the “original” people.140 
This reluctance to read the text in the light of natural law is especially 
patent and regrettable in the abortion cases141—most notably in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey142—in which Justice Scalia’s “leave it to the States” 
approach143 made little of the powerful protection afforded by the federal 
Constitution to persons—a concept, the one of “persons,” that in justice—
that is, in the light of natural law—ought to include unborn children 
whether or not this was within the original public meaning.  
The author is not the only natural law scholar to criticize Justice 
Scalia’s originalist view.144 In a 1998 piece, after criticizing the apparent 
                                                                                                             
 139. See Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, 
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Antonin 
Scalia ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1998). 
 140. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.  
 141. But the reluctance to read the Constitution in the light of natural law is 
regrettable not only in the abortion cases. Finnis notes the “Court’s radical failure” 
earlier, in the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857),  
to approach its duty of doing justice according to law without 
recognizing that law, the whole legal enterprise, is for the sake of 
persons, and that the founders’ intentions were therefore to be interpreted 
. . . in favor of the basic interests and well-being of every person within 
the jurisdiction so far as was possible without contradicting the 
Constitution’s provisions. 
Finnis, The Priority of Persons, supra note 133, at 78. 
 142. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 143. Id. at 1002 (“We should get out of this area, where we have no right to 
be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the country any good by remaining.”). 
 144. Other than Finnis, at least two natural law theorists have expressed some 
reservation, along perhaps a not altogether different line as his and the author’s. 
Kmiec says that his own “natural-law originalism” “is at odds with some of Justice 
Scalia’s broader claims accepting democratic result without qualification.” 
Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural-Law Originalism – Or Why Justice Scalia (Almost) 
Gets It Right, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 628 (1997). Later in the same text 
he implicitly criticizes Justice Scalia’s handling of the abortion question. Id. at 
63435, 635 n.28 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s “stating that ‘if [the positive] law 
is abortion, ‘the state should permit abortion, in a democracy’” overlooks that 
“reasoning from the natural-law meaning of person, precludes any government 
from authorizing abortion”). In a similar vein, Krason argues that the correct 
decision in Roe was not the one Justice Scalia favored dissenting in Casey but 
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refusal of the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, and later in Casey, to answer 
the question, “Who counts as person for the Constitution?” Finnis 
commented:  
This refusal has been made possible partly by the position of 
minority Justices such as Justice Antonin Scalia, who for clearly 
inadequate reasons would leave to the states the fundamental 
question of who is and who is not entitled to the protection of the 
United States Constitution’s guarantees against deprivation of life 
without due process of law.145 
In 2004, Finnis reiterated his critique of “judges, such as Justice Scalia, 
who interpret the Fourteenth Amendment's unelaborated references to 
‘persons’ as permitting states to treat as non-persons and to authorize the 
killing, or the enslavement (in embryo banks), of the unborn.”146 
By way of contrast, Finnis’s perhaps most important disciple, Robert 
P. George, holds a position rather close to Justice Scalia’s. Although he 
cautiously concedes that “it is not so clear to me that the American people 
have not, by ratification of the equal protection clause, committed 
themselves to a principle that is incompatible with laws that generally 
permit the killing of such human beings by abortion,”147 in the end, he 
defers the question to whatever was “the publicly understood meaning of 
the principle of equal protection that was ratified in the post-Civil War 
period.”148 To reach the right interpretation, his inquiry will start and end 
                                                                                                             
rather a solution recognizing the constitutional right to life of the unborn child and 
“declar[ing] legalized abortion to be unconstitutional.” Stephen M. Krason, 
Constitutional Interpretation, Unenumerated Rights, and the Natural Law, 1 CATH. 
SOC. SCI. REV. 20, 26 (1996). 
 145. John Finnis, Public Reason, Abortion, and Cloning, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 
361, 373 (1998). In a short column, Hadley Arkes recently made a point similar to 
Finnis’s. See Hadley Arkes, The Moral Turn, FIRST THINGS (May 2017), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/05/the-moral-turn (criticizing Justice 
Scalia’s stance in Casey and also hypothesizing that if the dissents in Roe and Doe 
had addressed the moral issues at stake—instead of “leaving it to the states”—the 
majority’s attitude in those cases would likely have been different) [https://per 
ma.cc/4RBX-JBLR]. 
 146. Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, supra note 8, at 59. 
 147. Robert P. George, The Natural Law Due Process Philosophy, 69 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2301, 2308 (2001). 
 148. Id. Compare and contrast with what Finnis says about the Dred Scott case, 
which is equally true of the abortion cases, as is clear from Finnis’s own argument, 
quoted elsewhere in this Article:  
The basic error of the Supreme Court . . . was to approach the 
interpretation of the Constitution's provision . . . without a strong 
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with a “rigorous and historically informed reading of the equal protection 
clause.”149 Although a historic inquiry should be the starting point,150 for 
the reasons offered in this Article, a historic inquiry certainly should not 
be the end. Professor Finnis expresses this view of this matter in a more 
perfect way: 
In adjudication and the practice of law, interpretation of 
constitutional and statutory texts and statements can never 
reasonably be exclusively historical. Constitutions and statutes 
arise for consideration—indeed, exist as law—only in a context of 
the interpreter's intention to serve persons and their well-being, 
the common good . . . .151 
 
With Professor Finnis’s clear guideline in mind, the author considers it 
time to wrap up the general argument in this Article.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has offered a scheme that scholars within the natural law 
tradition might develop in future explorations. It is true that this scheme 
lacks precision and might be a bit scanty at times. Perhaps this feeling is 
the result of the author heeding a wise idea: absent unequivocal violations 
of fundamental human rights, “very little of wide generality can be said to 
resolve determinately the many issues of interpretation.”152 With those 
potential explorations in mind, it is important to keep in mind that the 
application of sound moral principles—natural law principles—to matters 
like constitutional governance involves contingencies and circumstances 
about which reasonable people holding firmly to the principles can 
reasonably reach differing conclusions. Thus, the title to this Article is “A 
                                                                                                             
presumption that, whatever the assumptions and expectations of its 
makers, every constitutional provision must, if possible, be understood 
as consistent with such basic human rights as to recognition as a legal 
person. 
FINNIS, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, supra note 8, at 59. This is 
certainly far from George’s idea that the publicly understood meaning settles the 
question. 
 149. FINNIS, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, supra note 8, at 59. 
 150. “Constitutions and statutes call for historically accurate understanding, so 
far as it is possible. To say otherwise is to deny their authority to settle any of the 
questions of social life which need to be settled by law.” Id. at 58. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 59. 
904  LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
New Natural Law Reading of the Constitution” instead of “The New 
Natural Law Reading of the Constitution.”  
With the future and the past in mind, this Article has attempted to 
make clear that defending natural law’s traction in the context of 
constitutional interpretation is not equivalent to endorsing what is 
sometimes called the “living instrument interpretation” of the 
Constitution, that is, all kinds of judicial updating of a Constitution on the 
basis of all sorts of moral considerations, which may, on occasion, go 
under the name “natural law” but more commonly under the names 
“human rights” or “common good.” As it has been shown, more often than 
not, under the guise of certain moral readings of the Constitution but not 
according to the natural law, moral reading suggested in this Article, one 
finds a project of reforming the Constitution in violation of the 
responsibility to follow established processes of constitutional 
amendment153 while neglecting the onus of discharging the responsibility 
which could make constitutionally justifiable the judicial reform of the 
Constitution: namely the responsibility of demonstrating, carefully and 
even-handedly, that the founders of the Constitution were certainly 
committing a moral error—introducing an injustice—when drafting a 
certain provision.154 Fidelity to established law—be it constitutional or 
otherwise—ought to cede in the extreme circumstance that one can 
establish the law as unjust in a respect in which it is one’s own 
constitutional responsibility to reform it or violate it. But this extreme 
circumstance that could make natural law relevant in an extraordinary way 
is less frequent and, in that sense, less important than the myriad instances 
in which what is at stake is the interpretation of a just constitutional 
provision derived from natural law by way of conclusion or by way of 
determination. In these more common instances, natural law should track 
with the differing intensities identified in this Article.  
There are many gaps in the argument that need to be filled. The precise 
result of interpreting various constitutional rights in the light of natural law 
is not something that this Article has even come close to articulating in 
detail. Even less so has the author been able or willing to prove effectively 
what the consequences would be of a natural law reading of the structural 
                                                                                                             
 153. Pojanowski and Walsh rightly point out that in order for the “Constitution 
to accomplish as positive law what it purports to do as positive law, the decisions 
it reflects must be durable until changed on the terms the Constitution provides or 
the legal system ordered by the Constitution ends.” Pojanowski & Walsh, supra 
note 36, at 100. 
 154. See John Finnis, Judicial Law-Making and the “Living” 
Instrumentalisation of the ECHR, in LORD SUMPTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE 
LAW 73120 (Nicholas Barber, Richard Ekins & Paul Yowell eds., 2016). 
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parts of the Constitution and the extent to which the intention of the 
authors of the Constitution is relevant for purposes of arriving at a morally 
just reading.155 The author also has not been able or willing to answer how 
much natural law factors into those parts of the Constitution with more 
moral flesh. The author also did not address the ways in which this kind 
of inquiry is related with what others have called “the question why.”156  
Nevertheless, the map drawn here should be clear enough; hopefully 
in the future, a new and simultaneously old version of natural law will lead 
to a similarly new, moral reading of the Constitution. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 155. Although in constitutional interpretation the intent of the author(s) ought 
to matter, “as the very concept of authority to make or declare law entails,” “a 
properly juridical interpretation will not be as ready to consider authoritative an 
unjust as it will a just meaning.” Furthermore, although a historian will be “quick 
to detect, and not too ready to overlook their interlocutors’ vicious purposes and 
deficiencies of personal character,” the constitutional interpreter will always bear 
in mind that his guiding principle is the common good of the people rather than 
an indefeasible fidelity to the past. The intermediate quotations are from Finnis, 
The Priority of Persons, supra note 133, at 13, whom the author partly 
paraphrases here for the purpose of expressing a personal idea. 
 156. See Grégoire Webber, Asking Why in the Study of Human Affairs, 60 AM. 
J. JURIS. 51 (2015) (elaborating on the importance of asking why persons of a time 
and place acted the way they did and arguing for the relevance of determining the 
goal of a legislator when introducing law in a community).  
